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Introduction
This paper is motivated by an ongoing debate about the effects of Japan's monetary policy on Japan and on Japan's neighbors. Economists on one side of the debate argue that expansionary monetary policy in Japan can cause an increase in real output in Japan and positive spillover effects on real output of Japan's neighbors. 1 Economists on the other side of the debate argue that expansionary monetary policy in Japan 1 is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. 2 To give a specific example, a common view is that "loose" Japanese monetary policy aggravated the Asian crisis of 1997. 3 Each side of the debate invokes theoretical open-economy models to support its
claims. Monetary open-economy models predict that an expansionary monetary policy shock causes depreciation of the domestic currency. In addition, models with nominal rigidity predict that an expansionary monetary policy shock causes an increase in domestic real output in the short run. As regards effects of domestic monetary policy shocks on foreign real output, models with nominal rigidity make conflicting predictions. On the one hand, an increase in domestic real output tends to raise the demand for imports, causing a positive spillover effect on real output abroad. On the other hand, expansionary monetary policy causes real depreciation and thus diverts demand to domestic away from foreign goods -this is the beggar-thy-neighbor effect. 4 McKinnon and Schnabl (2002, 2003) argue that the beggar-thy-neighbor effect prevails in East Asia and that the effect can destabilize the region, which will have adverse consequences for Japan itself. Policymakers seem to share this point of view (see e.g. Fischer (2001) and Okina (1999) ). Yet which of the effects prevails is ultimately an empirical question.
This paper makes an empirical contribution to the debate. We use structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) to estimate the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on Japan and on Japan's neighbors. With SVARs we can estimate the effects of monetary policy shocks with much weaker a priori restrictions than are required in calibrated or estimated equilibrium models. To identify Japanese monetary policy shocks, we use four identification schemes. We believe that robust conclusions are best achieved by examining results from more than a single identification scheme.
Like both sides of the debate, in assessing the cross-border transmission mechanism
for Japanese monetary policy shocks we pay special attention to the external value of the yen and to international trade. 2 See e.g. Schnabl (2002, 2003) . 3 See Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) for a discussion. 4 See Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (2000) for a model of international spillover effects of monetary policy shocks. 2 Both sides of the debate presume that the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks can be large. We estimate the size of these effects. We find that domestic monetary policy shocks most likely explain at most 10% of the variation in Japan's real GDP and Japan's trade balance and at most 20% of the variation in the value of the yen with respect to the U.S. dollar in the last 40 years. 10% and 20% are nonnegligible numbers, but they are modest. We find that the contribution of Japanese monetary policy shocks to the variation in real GDP and trade balances of Japan's neighbors is even more modest, most likely about 5%. Thus Japanese monetary policy shocks have historically played only a modest role as a source of fluctuations in East Asia, contrary to what both sides of the debate presume.
We find that expansionary Japanese monetary policy shocks increase real output in Japan and depreciate the yen vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, as presumed by both sides of the debate, though these effects are uncertain and do not emerge clearly under all identification schemes.
The sides of the debate differ with respect to the sign of the international spillover effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks. We evaluate the sign of these effects. We find that an expansionary shock in monetary policy causes a decrease in net exports in Japan. Furthermore, net exports of Japan's neighbors increase in the short-run.
These results suggest that Japanese monetary policy shocks do not have beggar-thyneighbor effects. If beggar-thy-neighbor effects prevailed, we would expect to see an increase in net exports in Japan and a decrease in net exports in Japan's neighbors.
We obtain mixed results regarding the sign of the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on real output in Japan's neighbors.
We evaluate the view that "loose" Japanese monetary policy aggravated the Asian crisis. We find that expansionary monetary policy shocks did occur in Japan prior to the onset of the crisis. However, these shocks most likely had economically insignificant effects on exchange rates and real output in the region.
This paper connects with the literature employing SVARs to study the interna- The SVAR literature thus far studies only domestic effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks (Kim (1999) ). We extend the analysis to examine the impact of Japanese monetary policy shocks on the entire region of East Asia.
The SVAR methodology relies on weaker identifying restrictions than recent studies of international spillovers in East Asia. Kwan (2001) 
The model
The SVAR model that we use has the form (omitting the constant):
A(s)y(t − s) = (t), t = 1, .., T , where A(0) is an M ×M non-singular matrix measuring contemporaneous relations between M elements of y(t). The random variable (t) is Gaussian with zero mean and identity variance-covariance matrix, conditional on y(t − s) for all s > 0.
We denote with p * the optimal lag length, to be chosen. We can estimate a reducedform VAR with a one-step-ahead forecast error term u(t) = A −1 (0) (t), coefficients
and variance-covariance matrix of the one-step-ahead forecast
We conduct inference from a Bayesian perspective, as is common in the VAR literature (see e.g. Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and Uhlig (2005) ). We take draws from the posterior pdf of the parameters of the reduced-form VAR. This pdf is a product of an inverse-Wishart density for Ω and a Gaussian density for the equations' coefficients B(s) for all s > 0, conditional on Ω. 6 We use a variant of the prior common in the Bayesian VAR literature since the work of Sims and Zha (1998), discussed in Appendix A.
Our analysis has two steps. First, we estimate SVARs in order to uncover the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on real output in Japan and on the exchange rate between the yen and the U.S. dollar. The SVARs differ with respect to identifying assumptions but all include the same six variables (to be discussed below). Second, we add to the six-element-y(t) from the first step a variable that measures international trade flows or economic conditions in Japan's neighbors, e.g. average output in Japan's neighbors. We reestimate the SVARs with the added variable. The goal is to uncover the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on trade flows and on Japan's neighbors. We also check that the estimated effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on real output in Japan and on the value of the yen are not affected. 6 For robustness, since Gaussianity may not the best assumption due e.g. to the Asian crisis of 1997, we draw from a multivariate t-distribution with 3 degrees of freedom instead of drawing from a Gaussian pdf. 5 We repeat the second step several times, using different measures of trade flows and economic conditions in Japan's neighbors. 7 The y(t) vector in the first step includes six variables common in small-size SVARs for monetary policy analysis in open economies (see e.g. Kim (1999) and Sims (1992) ):
real GDP in Japan, consumer price index in Japan, a world commodity price index, the money-market interest rate in Japan, money stock M1 in Japan, and the exchange rate between the yen and the U.S. dollar. All time series are expressed in logarithm, except that the interest rate is in percentage points at an annual rate. The data run Details of the data are given in Appendix B. We estimate all models twice using, alternatively, quarterly and monthly data. In the first step, we estimate the six-variable SVAR models of Japan under different identifying assumptions. We employ a number of identifying schemes because we seek robust conclusions regarding the effects of Japanese monetary policy.
We begin by choosing the optimal number of lags p * in the reduced-form version of equation (2.1). We evaluate the Laplace approximation to marginal likelihood for several candidate models with different lag lengths p. This method of choosing among models is consistent regardless of whether data are stationary or nonstationary (see Kim (1998) ). We obtain p * = 2 with quarterly data and p * = 6 with monthly data.
Consider the estimated impulse responses of two main variables of interest to an "expansionary" shock in Japanese monetary policy. In Figure 1 we plot the impulse responses of real GDP in Japan and the exchange rate between the yen and the 7 Kim (2001) uses a similar two-step approach in a study of international spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy. Alternatively, we could imagine estimating SVARs for a long vector y(t) that included all variables of interest, from Japan and from Japan's neighbors. However, in this approach the number of parameters to be estimated would be too large relative to the sample size. 8 For estimation with monthly data when only a quarterly series is available we interpolate the quarterly series as in Mönch and Uhlig (2005) . The interpolation procedure makes use of the Kalman filter to make optimal predictions of, for example, monthly real GDP given quarterly real GDP and monthly real industrial production. In the first column we plot the results from the identification scheme that we refer to as CEE identification after Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999). 9 These authors argue that a good model of U.S. monetary policy is that current values of some variables are not in the information set of the Federal Reserve. Alternatively, the Federal Reserve takes at least one period to react to certain variables. Here we apply this model to identify Japanese monetary policy. Following CEE, we assume that A(0) is lower-triangular and we order variables in the y(t) vector as follows: real GDP, CPI, commodity prices, interest rate, money supply and exchange rate. We plot the impulse responses to a negative shock in the interest rate set by the Bank of Japan. Thick lines are medians and thin lines are 68% and 90% probability bands, computed from 1000 posterior draws. Japan's real GDP is estimated to increase slowly, reaching a maximum about 8 quarters after the monetary easing begins, and then returning to zero consistent with long-run neutrality of money. The yen is estimated to depreciate, although the short-run response is uncertain. Money supply increases on impact and the CPI increases after delay (not shown).
The CEE identification assumes that the interest rate set by the central bank can react to fluctuations in the exchange rate only with a lag of at least one period.
If the Bank of Japan in fact decreases the interest rate systematically and without delay in reaction to strengthening of the yen, the CEE identification may lead to incorrect inference. In the second column of Figure 1 , we plot the results from the identification scheme that we refer to as policy-instrument-last identification. We retain the assumption that A(0) is lower-triangular, but order the interest rate last.
The only change in the results is that the yen depreciates also in the short-run. The probability that monetary easing causes an increase in real GDP and the probability that monetary easing causes depreciation of the yen are each close to 1.
In the policy-instrument-last identification all variables, including the exchange rate, are assumed to react to monetary policy shocks only with delay. We now consider an identification scheme that lets the central bank react contemporaneously to 9 See also Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). 7 changes in the exchange rate and at the same time lets the exchange rate react contemporaneously to changes in monetary policy. We refer to this identification scheme as LSZ identification after Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) . 10 In the LSZ identification, we drop the assumption that A(0) is triangular and we partition the six elements of y(t) into three blocks. The block of "sluggish" variables includes real GDP, CPI and money stock. Variables in this block are postulated not to react contemporaneously to changes in variables in the other two blocks. The block of "fast-moving" variables includes commodity prices and the exchange rate. These variables are allowed to react without delay to all disturbances. The policy block includes the interest rate that is postulated not to react contemporaneously to changes in real GDP and CPI. We use importance sampling to draw from the posterior density of A(0), approximated by a multivariate t-distribution with 3 degrees of freedom (see Sims and Zha (1999) ).
In the third column of Figure 1 we plot the results from the LSZ identification. The median impulse responses of real GDP and the exchange rate are essentially the same under the LSZ identification as under both previously used identification schemes.
However, probability bands widen. The LSZ identification suggests that the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on real GDP in Japan and on the external value of the yen are quite uncertain. Specifically, the probability that monetary easing causes an increase in real GDP drops to roughly 0.8. The probability that monetary easing causes depreciation of the yen drops to 0.5-0.8.
In the fourth column of Figure 1 we show the results from a sign-restrictions identification scheme that eschews making any zero restrictions in the matrix A(0). Like Uhlig (2005), we impose identifying restrictions directly on impulse responses. 11 Observe that, in order to identify a monetary policy shock, we need to find only a single column of A −1 (0) -call it an impulse vector a -that measures how the elements of u(t) react to a change in a single element of the vector (t) that corresponds to the monetary policy shock. Let e A denote the lower-triangular Choleski factor of Ω.
Uhlig (2005) observes the following: since any A −1 (0) must satisfy e A = A −1 (0)Q for 10 See also Sims (1998). 11 For details see the discussion of identification with "pure" sign restrictions in Uhlig (2005) . See also Canova and De Nicolo (2002) and Faust (1998) . 8 some orthogonal matrix Q, it follows that a = e Aα where α is a vector with norm unity.
For each of the 1000 draws from the joint posterior density of Ω and B(s)'s, we take 100 draws of α from the standard normal pdf, normalizing each α to have unit length. We then compute 100,000 a's and the same number of candidate impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock. We define a monetary policy impulse vector to be an impulse vector a such that the impulse response generated with a of money supply is positive, of interest rate is nonpositive and of price level is nonnegative at all horizons k = 1, ..., K, for K that we choose a priori. We retain those of the 100, 000 draws that satisfy the sign restrictions. We use the retained draws to compute median impulse responses and probability bands, and discard the draws that fail to satisfy the restrictions.
We plot the results obtained with K = 4 in the fourth column of Figure 1 . The increase in real GDP apparent in columns 1-3 vanishes. We thus confirm the insight of Uhlig (2005) that not all plausible identification schemes support the conventional wisdom that real output changes after a monetary policy shock. As regards the impulse response of the exchange rate, the median decreases somewhat while probability bands remain as wide as in column 3. The results remain unchanged when we change the value of K.
3.2.
Variance decomposition of real GDP in Japan and the yen-dollar exchange rate. Each of the four identification schemes delivers the same conclusion regarding the contribution of shocks in Japanese monetary policy to the variation in Japan's real GDP and in the yen-dollar exchange rate. Only a modest fraction of the variance in either variable can be attributed to Japanese monetary policy shocks.
Japanese monetary policy shocks most likely account for less than 10% of the variance in Japanese real GDP and for less than 20% of the variance in the yen-dollar exchange rate. 12 12 As a specific example, consider the LSZ identification. The fraction of the variance in Japan's GDP due to monetary policy shocks is estimated to be less than 10% with probability 0.85 at all horizons between 1 and 16 quarters. show the results from the second step of our analysis. We add to the six-elementy(t) vector from the first step a variable that measures international trade flows or economic conditions in Japan's neighbors and we reestimate the SVARs. We continue employing our set of identifying schemes in the search for robust conclusions.
In the first column of Figure 2 , we report the results obtained in a seven-variable VAR where the added variable is the exchange rate between the yen and the average of the currencies of Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 13 In the top row we display the impulse response of the added variable to an expansionary Japanese monetary policy shock under the policy-instrument-last identification. In the bottom row we show the impulse response of the added variable under the sign-restrictions identification. 14 13 See Appendix B for a description of how all cross-country averages used in the paper were computed. These six countries are used throughout the paper as "the neighbors of Japan". Comparable and complete data series for China, Indonesia and Taiwan could not be found. 14 In the policy-instrument-last identification, the Japanese interest rate is allowed to react contemporaneously to fluctuations in the added variable. In the sign-restrictions identification, we 10 We find that the yen depreciates with respect to the currencies of Japan's neighbors by the same amount as it depreciates with respect to the U.S. dollar. The impulse responses are sharply estimated under each identification scheme. Our finding is consistent with the view that the currencies of Japan's neighbors follow the U.S. dollar after a Japanese monetary policy shock. 15 That the currencies of Japan's neighbors strengthen relative to the yen after Japanese monetary expansion plays a crucial role in the theoretical argument why Japanese monetary policy can have beggar-thy-neighbor effects.
In the second column of Figure 2 , we show the results obtained in a seven-variable SVAR where the added variable is the ratio of exports to imports in Japan. Under each identification, net exports in Japan are estimated to decrease gradually, reaching a minimum about 8 quarters after the impact of an expansionary Japanese monetary policy shock, and then returning gradually to zero. 16 Under each identification, the decrease in net exports is estimated to occur with probability close to 1. When we rerun the SVARs with Japanese exports and imports entered separately, we find that the decrease in net exports is due both to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports (not shown). Domestic monetary policy shocks are estimated to account for about the same fraction of the variance in net exports in Japan as in Japan's real GDP.
The finding that net exports decrease after domestic monetary expansion is not consistent with beggar-thy-neighbor effects of monetary policy. If beggar-thy-neighbor effects prevailed, we would expect to see depreciation of the yen divert demand to domestic away from foreign goods. Thus we would expect to see an increase in net exports (a decrease in imports and an increase in exports). Our finding is consistent with negative comovement between income and net exports at business cycle frequencies, due to consumption and investment demand being higher in expansions restrict the signs of the impulse responses of money supply, interest rate and price level in Japan (as in the previous sections). Furthermore, we restrict the sign of the impulse responses of the exchange rate between the yen and the U.S. dollar to be nonnegative and of world commodity prices to be nonnegative. 15 Japanese monetary policy shocks are estimated to account for at most 20% of the variance in the exchange rate between the yen and the average of the currencies of Japan's neighbors. 16 Net exports are expressed in real terms, so the estimates are not driven by valuation effects.
11 than in contractions. Observe that the dynamic path of net exports in Japan after a Japanese monetary policy shock -gradual change with maximum impact after about 8 quarters -is the same as the dynamic path of real GDP in Japan, seen in the first three columns of Figure 1 .
A depreciation of the yen with respect to the U.S. dollar is often presumed to hurt exporters from Japan's neighbors who sell their products in Japan, Europe and the United States, by making those products less competitive than Japanese goods. We now check if this effect is in the data. In the third column of Figure 2 by simulating the estimated SVARs, "subtracting" Japanese monetary policy shocks that occurred after e T . The simulations assume constant policy, not constant policycontrollable variables. Only variation in policy unpredictable to agents as of time e T is removed to obtain the simulated data, while keeping the part of the variation predictable as an equilibrium policy reaction function. 18 We are uncertain about the size of Japanese monetary policy shocks that occurred after e T . The simulations take this uncertainty into account. The error bands around the simulated data reflect the uncertainty both about the reduced-form parameters and the policy shocks.
The yen, which had followed an upward trend vis-à-vis the dollar, began depreciating in the middle of 1995. The depreciation continued for about three years and was perceived as having aggravated the Asian crisis. The decrease in the external value of the Japanese currency was seen as being caused by an exogenous shift to "loose" policy by the Bank of Japan, as the Bank cut its short-term interest rate during 1995 17 The impulse response of real GDP in Korea remains unchanged when sub-samples are considered, except that error bands become wider. 18 See Uhlig (2001) for a discussion of why "on-the-equilibrium" zero-shock projections are preferable to constant-policy-instrument projections. 13 from about 2.3% to 0.5% in a series of quick moves. Thus a reasonable restriction on e T is "before the beginning of 1995".
We define ν(t) to be an artificial SVAR "innovation" given that the monetary policy shock is zero: ν(t) ≡ u(t) − a j (t), where u(t) is the one-step-ahead forecast error term, a is the monetary policy impulse vector and j (t) is the monetary policy shock. Taking as given y( e T ), we simulate paths of y( e T + s) for s = 1, ..., T − e T using a modified version of equation (2.1):
with ν(t) being drawn from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance-
In Figure 4 we show the actual data (thick lines) as well as the median and 90%
probability bands for the simulated data with e T set to December 1994, under the signrestrictions identification. 19 The probability bands show what actual data would have looked like with 90% probability, had there been no Japanese monetary policy shocks from December 1994 onwards.
The results suggest that expansionary monetary policy shocks did occur in Japan in 1995. By the end of 1995, the interest rate and the money supply in Japan cross the bounds for the projection conditional on the absence of policy shocks (see the top row of Figure 4) . However, the results do not suggest that the policy shocks in 1995 made a significant contribution to the depreciation of the yen that began in that year.
If anything, we find an appreciation of the Japanese currency caused by policy shocks in the first half of 1995 (see the first column in the bottom row). Most important, the results do not warrant the conclusion that the path of real GDP in Korea would have been different in the absence of Japanese monetary policy shocks (see the second column in the bottom row). The results fail to support the view that expansionary shocks in Japanese monetary policy contributed to the Asian crisis. However, it is possible that our failure to find support for this view is due in part to uncertainty 19 The results are unchanged under the other identification schemes and for different e T 's. Before plotting, the variables in Figure 4 were converted back from logarithms to levels whenever appropriate.
14 associated with the estimates. Note the wide error bands for the projections in Figure   4 .
3.6. Other experiments and robustness. We investigate the possibility of reducing the dimension of the estimated models via a Granger causal priority restriction.
We test the hypothesis that Japanese variables are Granger causally prior with respect to real GDP in Korea in the seven-variable VAR model used in the second step of the analysis. We evaluate the Laplace approximation to marginal likelihood for the model with the Granger causality restriction and for the model without the restriction. We find that the model without the Granger causality restriction fits the data better. This suggests that there is non-negligible feedback to Japan's economy from Japan's neighbors. At the same time, we find that the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on Japanese variables estimated in the first step of the analysis remain unchanged when regional variables are included in the second step. This suggests that Japanese monetary policy does not react in a significant way to regional variables. The feedback to Japan's economy from Japan's neighbors appears to operate via non-policy variables.
Adding variables measuring economic conditions in the United States (the Federal
Funds rate and U.S. real GDP) does not affect the estimated effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks. This suggests that the Bank of Japan does not adjust its interest rate systematically in responses to events in the U.S. economy. Alternatively, the events in the U.S. economy relevant for the Bank of Japan's decisions are already reflected in world commodity prices and the exchange rate between the yen and the U.S. dollar.
We investigate stability of the estimated VAR coefficients over time. We find that the models with coefficients restricted to be constant throughout the sample achieve 
where t * m,s is an artificial date for a dummy observation, and σ m is set equal to the sample standard deviation of p initial conditions for each m'th variable. All estimates assume, like Sims and Zha (1998), π = 5 and e π = 1.
Appendix B. Data
Datastream is the source for all data from Asia and for data on world commodity prices. Each column shows impulse responses of real GDP in Japan (top row) and the yen-USD exchange rate (bottom row) over 16 quarters (with 68% and 90% probability bands) to a one-standard-deviation expansionary shock in Japanese monetary policy. The columns differ with respect to the identifying assumptions. Each row shows impulse responses of real GDP in Korea and of average real industrial production in Japan's neighbors, over 16 quarters (with 68% and 90% probability bands), to a one-standard-deviation expansionary shock in Japanese monetary policy. The rows differ with respect to the identifying assumptions. 
